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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL*
Michael S. Baram**
The emerging concepts of corporate responsibility and technology assessment
are, to a considerable extent, responses to problems arising from technological developments and their applications by industry and government.
These problems appear in the relatively discrete sectors of consumer
protection and occupational safety and in the diffuse sectors of community
quality of life and the national and international environments.
Consumer Protection
As products have become more sophisticated and defects in them less
easily detected by the consumer, the common-law principle of caveat emptor,
"let the buyer beware" has been largely abandoned by the courts, and the
principle of strict corporate liability has been frequently adopted. 1 Federal
and state legislation and regulatory agencies for consumer protection have
multiplied with this shifting of responsibility. Nevertheless, common law,
legislation, and regulation pertaining to product safety have been largely
ineffective (See footnote 1, p. 2):
"... federal authority to curb hazards in consumer products is virtually non-existent ... legislation consists of a series of

isolated acts treating specific hazards in narrow product categories ....

Despite its humanitarian adaptations to meet the chal-

lenge of product-caused injuries, the common law puts no reliable
restraint upon product hazards."
*Reprinted by special permission from the May 4, 1973 issue of Science, p.
465-473, published by the American Association for the Advancement of
Science.
**Michael S. Baram, a member of the Massachusetts Bar, is associate professor
of civil engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and special faculty at Boston University School of Law.
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As a result, Ralph Nader and other crusaders have mobilized citizens
against specific technological developments embodied in hazardous products
and processes - such as the Corvair and various food additives.
The 92nd Congress enacted the Consumer Product Safety Act, thereby
creating an independent commission with the authority to develop mandatory safety standards for many product categories and to carry out related
functions to protect consumers. 2 However, regulation of automobiles, drugs,
boats, foods, and other product categories is excluded and left to existing
programs. The commission is expected to maintain the regulatory agency
tradition of reliance on industrial testing and reports; and "Except for the
availability of [commission] information and the opportunity for litigants to
argue the fact of compliance or noncompliance with mandatory Government
standards, the law is expected to have little effect on products liability
litigation." 3 It is too early to determine whether or not the law will bring
about an effective regulatory program.

Occupational Health and Safety
The incidence of harm to workers, the difficulties of employee recovery
under the common law, and the inability of the judicial system to internalize
such "costs" sufficiently to bring about a preventive approach by corporate
management are among the factors that led to workmen's compensation laws
and insurance programs, 4 and agency standards for occupational hazards. The
National Labor Relations Act, 5 and most recently the Occupational Safety
and Health Act 6 have provided frameworks for decision-making on automation and hazardous technological developments. Nevertheless, high injury
rates persist in several industrial sectors 7 as old and new technology continues
to create lethal environments for employees - for example, "The National
Academy of Sciences reports a study showing that the life-span of radiologists
is five years shorter than the national average. . . ." (See footnote 8, p.13)
The introduction of new automation technology has traditionally
brought about strong union opposition because of impacts on job security. 9
Now, impacts on employee health provide new bases for opposition. As a
result, some new, highly automated plants have been shut down - Rio
Tinto's lead processing plant in the United Kingdom and General Motors'
Vega plant in Lordstown, Ohio, have recently suspended operations until the
economic and the physical and mental health effects of new automation
technology on employees could be determined and diminished. 1 0

Community Quality of Life
The impacts of industrial and government technology on health, land
use, esthetics, and other aspects of community quality of life 11 have finally
aroused organized citizen opposition. Government transportation and energy
programs are now persistently opposed by local communities. Corporations
that have traditionally provided the economic base for communities are now
80
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increasingly confronted by litigants seeking compensatory damages, restraining orders, and injunctions; by newly aggressive local officials responding to
citizen complaints and invoking long-dormant police powers against noise,
smoke, and other nuisances; and by state and federal officials enforcing air
and water quality programs. Despite judicial reluctance to enjoin ongoing
industrial activity that concurrently provides local economic benefits and
environmental degradation, 1 2 the expanding enforcement of public nuisance
and pollution control laws has recently brought about a number of plant
closures. 13
Nevertheless, the economic objectives of states and local communities
and the fear of job losses and other dislocations that would arise from project
or plant shutdowns will continue to determine the pace at which community
14
quality of life is rehabilitated and environmental degradation controlled.
The comples task of resource management must be undertaken by state and
local governments. How else to reconcile the objectives of economic and
social opportunity - housing, economic development, transportation, and so
on - with enhanced community quality of life - open space, recreation,
esthetically pleasing surroundings, population stability? The reconciliation of
such diverse objectives will not be possible until the consequences of
technology can be systematically assessed, until rational siting and land use
guidelines have been established, and until state and regional planning find a
viable political structure.

National Environmental Quality
Ehrlich, Commoner, and other early crusaders may have been critically
received, but nations are now embarking on serious, more effective pollution
control programs. In the United States, the new water pollution control
program has been designed to achieve use of the "best practicable" pollution
control technology by 1977, the "best available" technology by 1983, and a
national "no pollution discharge" goal by 1985.15 The air quality program
provides authority for federal control over new stationary sources of air
pollution, over automotive emissions, and over all sources of air pollutants
hazardous to human health. 1 6 New legislation has established federal
authority to limit the noise emissions of numerous corporate products; 1 7 and
laws to tighten up control over pesticides and hazardous materials have again
been enacted. 1 8
The national commitment now authorizes control over most forms of
pollution caused by technological processes, ensuring more rigorous analysis,
regulation, enforcement, and citizen participation. 19 Nevertheless, many technology-created pollution problems remain - the management and disposal of
radioactive waste, toxic materials, sludge, and solid waste. In addition, new
technologies such as weather modification and marine resource extraction are
now being developed and experimentally applied, and they will undoubtedly
create new problems and new legislation in our already "lawridden society."
(See footnote 19, p. 32.) The pattern is obvious and disturbing: the
development of a technological advance, insistence upon its application by
interest groups in industry and government, utilization, the appearance of
environmental problems, legislation, regulation, and extensive litigation to
control environmental impacts. 20
WINTER 1973
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Assumptions

These problems of consumers, employees, communities, and nations are
the results of the processes we use to develop, apply, and regulate our
technology - of our methods of social control. Social control is, in turn, the
result of complex interactions of underlying political, economic and cultural
forces.
What is to be done? We can continue to grapple with the problems as
they crystallize, using the established and ineffective patterns of post hoc
legislation, regulation, and litigation. On the other hand, we can boldly
attempt to alter the underlying forces or causes, and their interactions, but
this calls for information we do not have and demands an acknowledgement
that the forces at work in different political systems are yielding substantially
21
similar problems.
The most feasible strategy appears to be one of intervening in those
decision-making processes of the public and private sectors that bring about
technological applications; such intervention would take the form of
introducing new frameworks for planning and decision-making. The development and use of coherent frameworks for technology assessment and
utilization could meet many of the demands for corporate and governmental
responsibility. Clearly, the use of such frameworks will affect the underlying
social forces not directly confronted and will entail considerable reliance on
22,
23
established legal and regulatory procedures.
The task of developing frameworks for technology assessment and
utilization must be undertaken in full recognition of several realities.
1) Application of any such framework to a particular technological
advance will yield differences in opinion and information from professionals,
as well as from concerned citizens.
2) Continuing research, monitoring experiments, and changing designs
will not necessarily resolve such differences, but will generally reveal the
transscientific nature of decisions to be made about the further development
and utilization of a specific technological advance: for example, the decisions
will ultimately involve value-based consideration of the probable harm of the
24
advance and the scope, magnitude, and acceptability of that harm.
3) Receptors - consumers, employees, and citizens generally - will
find elitist decision-making and compensatory solutions to possible harmful
effects inadequate, and they will actively seek to participate in the planning,
design, and implementation stages of the technology application process.
4) A multiplicity of inadequate decision frameworks for technology
assessment and utilization already exist and are employed by, for example,
Congress, regulatory agency officials, corporate management, insurance
rate-setters, courts, and organized citizens's groups.
Given this statement of the problem and these assumptions, it appears
that the task is to somehow "get it all together" - to develop an
understanding of how technology interacts with society and its institutions of
social control; to demonstrate that citizens, corporations, and public
institutions are all interrelated in specific patterns and thereby share
responsibility for rational planning and decision-making; and to shape a
82
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common conceptual framework that can be readily applied by each
decision-maker, in order that the different results can be compared
meaningfully and used to choose knowledgeably among alternatives.
Developing a Coherent Framework
Technology is dependent upon processes that occur in four interrelated
contexts: basic research, applied research, the development of prototypes for
testing or experimentation, and ongoing production and utilization. Although
it is difficult to pinpoint the path of any specific development, it is clear that
most technology (in the form of processes, products, or techniques) in use
today was brought about by the interactions of people and findings in these
25
four contexts.
Within each context different levels and kinds of resources, or unputs
are required - for example, manpower, funds, time, facilities, education, and
materials - but large social and economic commitments and irreversible
commitments of natural resources are usually made only when the development and experimentation phase is undertaken. These large commitments
lend an inevitability to the technological advance, because few courts and
federal agencies have been willing to halt major socioeconomic commitments,
irrespective of hazards to individuals or society. 2 6
The technology that emerges subsequently brings about social and
environmental effects, or outputs - direct and indirect, primary and secondary, beneficial and detrimental, measurable and unmeasurable. Whether one
uses nuclear power or the snowmobile as an example of current applications
of technology, several classes of effects are apparent. These include effects on
health (mental and physical, somatic and genetic), economy (individual and
corporate, local and national, international), environment (pollution, disruptions of ecosystems), resources (availability of materials, land, and waters for
competing uses), values (changes that are ultimately reflected in new law and
policy), and sociopolitical institutions and processes (structural and substantive changes). As these and other effects are aggregated, they determine the
quality of life.
We have no quantifiable information on many of these effects; nor can
we accurately predict potential effects, their synergism, or the intervention of
exogenous forces such as population migration or natural disasters. We do not
have devices sophisticated enough to monitor and assess many of these
effects, nor do we have articulated goals or indices to measure progress
toward such goals (See footnote 23). Decisions on goals, indices, and effects
are now, and will probably always remain, transscientific.
But we have learned one thing well - that impacts and amenities which
are unmeasurable or unquantifiable are nevertheless real and should be as
integral to decision-making as quantifiable technical and economic considerations. At the federal level, this has been clearly expressed in the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969,27 which requires that "unquantifled environmental amenities and values" be considered along with technological and economic or quantitative inputs to public agency decision-making
on projects, permits, contracts, and other major actions when such actions are
likely to result in significant environmental impacts. Agencies are now
struggling with this new requirement as they develop environmental impact
WINTER 1973
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assessments, which are subsequently exposed to the public for review before
agency action. Public response to over 3000 impact statements during the
past 2 years has ranged from acquiescence, to intervention in agency
proceedings, to political pressure, to extensive litigation. 2 8
Following this brief discussion of inputs to and outputs of the process
of technological advance, a simple model can be developed which relates a
specific technological development to resources (inputs) and effects (outputs)
(Fig. 1).

(inputs)

technological advance

(outputs)

Natural, human, and
fiscal resources

Related program contexts

Prim
d
secondary efects

Funds

Basic research

Manpower

Applied research

Economic

Time

Development and
experimentation
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Facilities

Production and
utilization

Health

Resource availability

Materials

Value change

Education

Sociopolitical

Natural resources
such as air,
water, land

In the several societal
sectors: consumer,
occupational, community,
and regional and national
environments

Fig. 1. Resources (inputs) and effects (outputs) of technological developments.
The implementation of each program will depend on a variety of
decision-makers in both public and private sectors and at varying jurisdictional levels- local, state, regional, and federal. These decision-makers
function as controls on any program in essentially two ways (Fig. 2): (i) by
controlling resources (for example, public and private sources of manpower
and funds for research and development; land use and natural resource
authorities; federal and state legislatures, whose enactments may be essential
to the availability of other program resources; and educators, who determine
training programs) and (ii) by controlling the detrimental effects (for
example, the courts by means of preliminary or permanent injunctions or
awards of compensatory damages; federal agencies, such as the Food and
Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency, and their
84
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state counterparts by engaging in standard-setting, regulation, and enforcement; and program managers, corporate management, and insurance ratesetters by bringing about program or product redesign to abate or ameliorate
specific effects).
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Fig. 2. Decision-makers.

To further develop this model, some of the major influences on
decision-makers who control technological developments must be determined. These influences (Fig. 3) include information on: (i) resource
availability; (ii) technical and economic feasibility; (iii) actual and potential
effects; and (iv) operational-institutional values, which are comprised of the
common law, legislation, economic and social policy, institutional management policies, and other "given" values that have been recognized and
accepted by decision-makers as of the time any specific decision is made
regarding further program development. These include diverse and often
conflicting laws and policies - for example, NEPA (to foster the conservation
and rational use of resources) and the oil depletion allowance (to foster rapid
exploitation of resources).
To complete this general model, the social dynamics of any program of
technological advance must be considered further - specifically, the
responses of individual citizens and organized interest groups to perceived
resource commitments and program effects (Fig. 4). These responses can be
manifested through institutional procedures for changing the laws and
policies that influence decision-makers - a lengthy process requiring extensive aggregation of voters or shareholders and generally undertaken in order
to influence future decisions, not the particular decision that provoked the
response.
WINTER 1973
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Fig. 3. Information flows to decision-makers.

Fig. 4. Summary of influences on decision-making.

JURIMETRICS JOURNAL

Responses can also be manifested through formal, adversarial procedures to challenge decision-making - for example, injured consumers can go
to court and disturbed environmentalists can intervene in agency proceedings
or seek judicial review of agency decisions. Finally, a variety of informal
procedures can be employed to feed back responses to decision-makers such as demonstrations, employee absenteeism, product boycotts, consumer
choice, or quasipolitical campaigns. The environmental and consumer
protection movements serve as vivid examples of these new pressures on
decision-makers, pressures new only in their intensity.
Citizens responding to perceived detrimental effects or resource misuse
comprise a diverse group of consumers, shareholders, unions, crusaders, and
citizens' organizations, ranging from those with national objectives (for
example, the Sierra Club) to those with local or self-interest objectives (for
example, labor unions, airport neighbors). The responses manifested through
institutional, formal-adversarial, or informal procedures for exerting pressure
on decision-makers may, in time, become so widespread or aggregated that
they will be incorporated into the common law or form the basis for new
management policy or legislation and, as such, become part of the matrix of
operational-institutional values. This has already occurred to a considerable
extent with regard to environmental and consumer protection responses.
Although the sector of society that responds adversely to the effects of
a specific technological development does not normally constitute a
democratic majority in its early stages, the issues raised by such responses
deserve serious consideration, and the procedures for eliciting such responses
are being strengthened by the courts and legislatures. First, the responses
represent new perceptions, new "pieces of the truth" that were either
unknown to, ignored, or lightly considered by decision-makers. Second, they
represent market and political influence that can be magnified by use of the
media. Third, although they may be ignored at first, these responses will
continue to appear in various forms and may bring about delays that are more
costly after a program has been started (the utilities and the Atomic Energy
Commission, for example, are now finding this out as they attempt to further
the nuclear power program: plant construction and operation are running
more than 2 years behind schedule, with greatly increased costs, because of
extensive litigation and hearings, 2 9 which resulted from an earlier failure to
consider citizens' concern about thermal and radioactive waste disposal,
reactor safety, and related ecological and health issues. Fourth, such
responses are based on real concerns, will often find larger public support,
and eventually could result in stringent legislation or judicial findings that
30
decision-makers would have to live with.
Finally, a citizenry that expresses a diversity of interests is the most
effective mode of promoting the accountability of decision-makers to the full
social context in which they operate. Too often, decision-makers in all
institutions have failed to inform the public about the bases and risks of
decisions, thereby precluding feedback of larger social issues and humanistic
3
concerns in their effort to promote institutional or self-interest objectives. 1
But the benefits of an informed and responsive public have now been
adequately demonstrated. Cars will be cleaner by 1975; the Army Corps of
Engineers will not continue to dam rivers and spend public funds without
more rigorous analysis of impacts and needs; the Food and Drug Administration will begin informing the public of the chemical contents and quality
WINTER 1973

control criteria of specific consumer products they regulate; maximum
permissible exposures of workers and the public to power-plant radiation
have been falling. These are some of the recent "accountability" benefits that
are being derived from public pressure.
Decision-making in both public and private institutions supporting
technological programs and applications is becoming more complicated and
less efficient, in the institutional short-term sense; but long-term efficiencies,
in terms of larger social interests such as public health, can be expected. In
more pragmatic economic and political terms, it has become increasingly
apparent that it is in the long-term self-interest of decision-makers and their
institutions to be open and responsive to the interests of the public. As David
Rockefeller has defined the issue for the private sector: 3 2

"The question really comes down to this: Will business leaders seize the initiative to make necessary changes and take on new
responsibilities voluntarily, or will they wait until these are thrust
upon them by law? Some adjustments are inevitable . . . there
may have to be new laws to force consideration of the
quality-of-life dimension so that more socially responsive firms
will not suffer a competitive disadvantage. It is up to the
businessman to make common cause with other reformers... to
initiate necessary reforms that will make it possible for business
to continue to function in a new climate as a constructive force in
our society."

In the public sector, opposition to projects and the failing credibility of
programs have prompted several agencies to increase citizen participation in
program planning and design - beyond the environmental impact statement
requirements of NEPA.33
The model I have presented (Fig. 4) does not provide any answers, but
it can be used for several purposes: to widen the perceptions of planners,
designers, and decision-makers responsible for specific technological advances
and applications; to depict the interrelationships of resources, effects,
decision-makers, institutions, and citizens; to develop policy, management, or
program alternatives in the corporate, congressional, and public agency
sectors that support and regulate technological development and utilization;
and to assess, with public participation, the impacts of technological
developments before they are utilized. Above all, the model articulates an
accounting system, or framework, for decision-making that is dynamic and
that can be used by all of the decision-makers, irrespective of their interests.
The model has also proved helpful in the development of curricula and
research: by making possible the ordering and integration of diverse
perspectives and events and by providing an understanding of the patterns of
technological development, application, and impacts, as well as social
responses to technology. This understanding extends to technology in
general, as well as to developments in such specific areas as mariculture,
housing, and bioengineering. 34
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Reforms in Process
A number of recent legal developments can be related directly to the
model, particularly to the sector designated "citizen responses to perceived
effects and commitments" of technology. For citizen responses to be
responsible, the flow of information to the public about effects and
commitments - actual and potential - must be coherent and balanced, and it
must present alte:natives with their uncertainties in comparable terms. For
citizen responses to be meaningful, the processes of planning, design, and
decision-making must be accessible to citizens and open to their concerns.
For example, NEPA requires federal agencies to assess environmental
impacts before "major actions" are taken. These actions range from the
Atomic Energy Commission's approval of a construction license for a nuclear
plant to be built by a utility, to the funding of increments of the highway
program by the Department of Transportation, to authorization by the
Department of Agriculture for the use of herbicides and pesticides. The
responsibility for assessment is broad and must include full consideration of
five issues: 3 5

(1) potential environmental impact,
(2) unavoidable adverse impacts,
(3) irreversible commitments of resources,
(4) short-term use considerations versus long-term resource
needs, and
(5) alternatives to the proposed action.

Draft and final impact assessments are made available to other
governmental officials and to the public for review and further development
under guidelines established by the Council on Environmental Quality. 3 6 ,37
Although NEPA does not provide veto power to any official, even if the
project poses real environmental hazards, the act does provide new
information to the public - by exposing the extent to which environmental
effects are being considered by the agency - and provides an enlarged record
for judicial review of agency decisions. Obvious deficiencies in an agency's
procedure, the scope of its statement, or the content of its statement will, on
the basis of experience since NEPA was enacted, result in citizen intervention
in agency processes, political opposition, and litigation. Many projects
proposed and assessed have been delayed, and, in some cases, projects have
been abandoned. Other projects have proceeded after being redesigned to
ameliorate those effects on the environment that generated controversy (See
footnote 23, pp. 221-267).
Most projects involve applications of existing technology, but a few
involve the development of new technologies - for example, the Department
of Transportation's air cushion vehicle, the Atomic Energy Commission's
liquid metal fast breeder reactor, cloud seeding experiments of the National
Science Foundation and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration, and the use of polyvinylchloride containers, to be approved
by the Internal Revenue Service, for alcoholic beverages. 3 8
WINTER 1973

NEPA does not expressly require consideration of social, health, or
economic impacts or of secondary effects such as subsequent population
migration and land development. These considerations are frequently ignored
or treated in cursory fashion, even though they are integral to comprehensive
assessment of project impacts and decision-making. NEPA does not impose
assessment and exposure processes on industry or the private sector, but,
whenever a utility, corporation, or other private institution is the applicant or
intended beneficiary of federal agency funds, license, or other "major.
action," its proposal is subject to the NEPA process. There have been
suggestions that NEPA be extended directly to the private sector, but as yet
these have not been seriously considered at the federal level. However,
variants of NEPA have been adopted by several states, and more states are
expected to follow suit. 3 9 Because of state and local control of land use,
state versions of NEPA have the potential for directly affecting land
development activities in the private sector. This potential has been realized
in California, where the state supreme court has determined that the state's
Environmental Quality Act requires county boards of supervisors to conduct
environmental assessments before issuing building permits for housing
projects and other land developments to the private sector.4 0 Similar
requirements may apply to the private sector in Massachusetts, where the new
environmental assessment requirements are imposed on "political subdivisions" as well as on state agencies and officials. 4 1
Therefore, the model can be further developed by adding environmental impact assessments by public decision-makers at the point where
resources are to be committed to certain types of projects that apply "old"
technology, as well as to certain activities that will involve the further
advance or application of new technology. Concomitantly, the flow of
information to citizens has been enhanced.
The development of impact statements is a meaningless exercise unless
they are actually used in decision-making. 4 2 It is difficult to use impact
statements because of the diversity and the essentially unquantifiable nature
of the new factors they present - since most agency decision-making depends
on quantification of technical and economic factors (See footnote 37). The
use of impact statements in the last stage of a project, such as the awarding of
construction contracts, is deceptive. The earlier stages of planning and design
may not have included assessment, thereby precluding citizen inputs at a time
when more important changes in project plans and alternatives could have
been accomplished. In other words, effective use of impact assessment
techniques and citizen feedback can be more readily achieved in the earlier,
less tangible stages of a project - precisely when most agencies prefer to plan
and design without public intervention. Hopefully, litigation and subsequent
judicial review will impose the NEPA framework earlier in agency pro43
cesses.
Further difficulties with the NEPA process have become apparent.
There is an inherent conflict in the requirement that the agency proponent of
a project asses it and discuss alternatives. After all, the agency has already
selected an alternative and has undertaken the impact assessment essentially
to justify its choice. Subsequent discussion of alternatives is too often a
superficial process of setting up "straw alternatives" for facile criticism.
Clearly, independent review of all the alternatives, including the proposed
JURIMETRICS JOURNAL

agency action, would be desirable. However, independent review would also
require the structuring 4 of new agency procedures and independent insti4
tutions for assessment.
Finally, the problem of dealing with unquantifiable impacts remains.
The assignment of values and weights to environmental and social amenities
may either be arbitrary or intentionally designed to produce decisions that
had been predetermined by agency officials.
Despite these difficulties and the numerous conflicts and increased
costs that now attend agency programs, NEPA is slowly forcing wiser
environmental practices, more sensitive agency bureaucracies, and more
effective roles for citizens. It is possible that the NEPA process could
eventually provide the basis, not for conflict in the courtroom or at agency
hearings, but for negotiation in good faith between interested parties over
points of dispute as revealed by the environmental assessment. 4 5 The
resolution of labor-management conflicts under the National Labor Relations
Board provides useful experience that should be reviewed for possible
application to the NEPA context.
A major extension of NEPA practices to the assessment of new
technology may have been accomplished with the passage of the Technology
Assessment Act of 1972.46 This law established within the legislative branch
an Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to "....

provide early indications

of the probable beneficial and adverse impacts of the applications of
technology and to develop other coordinate information which may assist the
Congress. . .

."

The office is required to undertake several tasks (See footnote

46, sec. 3):
(1) identifying existing or proable impacts of technology or
technological programs;
(2) where possible, ascertaining cause and effect relationships;
(3) identifying alternative technological methods of implementing specific programs;
(4) identifying alternative programs for achieving requisite
goals;
(5) estimating and comparing the impacts of alternative
methods and programs;
(6) presenting findings of completed analyses to the appropriate legislative authorities;
(7) identifying areas where additional research or data
collections is required ... ;
(8) undertaking ... additional associated activities....
Assessments to be carried out ".

.

. shall be made available to the initi-

ating... or other appropriate committees of the Congress... [and] may be
made available to the public. . . ." (See footnote 46)

The law does not distinguish between technological developments in
the public agency and private sectors and presumably includes technology
being developed with private funds. Although provided with the authority to
subpoena witnesses, OTA ".

.

. shall not, itself, operate any laboratories, pilot

plants, or test facilities." The broad language of the assessment requirements
and the way in which assessments are used by Congress effectively preclude a
WINTER 1973

substantial replication of the litigation and other conflicts that have
characterized the NEPA experience.
Political conditions will inevitably determine the initiation of OTA
studies and their use by congressional committees, and it appears that the
public will, in general, be unable to secure judicial review to promote
accountability of OTA and Congress.
The burden of formulating guidelines to describe when OTA should be
called upon by Congress and prescribing procedures for providing information
to the public clearly lies with the OTA board and advisory council. Above all,
it appears essential that OTA develop and articulate a coherent framework for
all technology assessments to be undertaken. Such a framework would
prevent OTA assessments from becoming skillfully contrived, ad hoc case
studies, which would be essentially closed to the introduction of important
information from citizens and interest groups. OTA therefore has the
additional burden of laying out a framework that will replace the multiple,
partial models employed by different interests, that will promote inputs from
interdisciplinary and humanistic sources, and that will clearly present, in a
replicable format, the quantifiable and unquantifiable costs and benefits of
new technilogical developments and applications.
Procedures to enhance the flow of balanced information on technological developments to the public will inevitably face the problem of
47
information manipulation and secrecy practices.
"The public's need for information is especially great in the
field of science and technology, for the growth of specialized
scientific knowledge threatens to outstrip our collective ability
to control its effects on our lives."
Secrecy on the part of public agencies and the executive branch is still
common practice to protect decision-making processes from public criticism,
despite the 1967 Freedom of Information Act.4 8 However, sustained public
pressures for the release of nonclassified information have made such secrecy
more controversial and somewhat more difficult to justify. The recent passage
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act may bring about the diminution of
another important form of secrecy in the public sector - agency advisory
committee proceedings and recommendations, which are used in setting
49
standards and other decision processes.
The common law of trade secrets is similarly invoked to protect
corporate information - presumably from the competition (the common law
basis for the concept), 5 0 but increasingly from the public and government.
The Environmental Protection Agency has been unable to secure information
on the quantities of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) made and sold by the
one American manufacturer, despite evidence that PCB's are now part of the
international pollution problem. 5 1 In other industrial technology sectors,
however, congressional legislation has provided the government with access to
information and procedures normally cloaked by trade secrecy. For example
section 206(c) of the Clean Air Act (See footnote 16) provides that the
Environmental Protection Agency may:
JURIMETRICS JOURNAL

"... enter at reasonable times, any plant or other establishment of such [auto engine] manufacturer, for the purpose of
conducting tests of vehicles or engines in the hands of the
manufacturer or ...to inspect ... records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities used by such manufacturer in
conducting tests... [regarding motor vehicle and engine compliance with EPA regulations] ."
A similar section in the 1972 Water Pollution Control Act (15, sect. 308)
also provides the Environmental Protection Agency access to secret information held by water polluters. It appears that Congress is now aware of
trade secrecy as an obstruction to pollution control and is willing to begin
limiting the antisocial uses of secrecy to some extent.
Finally, trade secrecy, in its present forms, will certainly obstruct the
development of meaningful "corporate social audits" that David Rockefeller
and other industrial leaders have called for. Legal sanctions for corporate
secrecy obviously must be challenged if corporate responsibility and
technology assessment are to be realized.
Beyond secrecy lies the problem of corporate advertising for new
products and technological processes. Here, too, developments in the courts
and regulatory agencies indicate that better information must be provided the
public. The rapid evolution of the "Fairness Doctrine" now means that radio
and television broadcast licensees must make reasonable and fair presentations of the contrasting sides of a controversial issue, once such issue has
been raised (usually by advertising) on licensee broadcast time. As expressed
in a recent law review note: "This obligation is incurred even at the licensee's
expense if no sponsorship is available . . . [although] the licensee has
discretion to determine how the contrasting sides will be presented and who
will be the spokesman" (See footnote 52, p. 109).
The doctrine has been applied by federal courts to cases of product
advertising (cigarettes, large-engine automobiles, and high-test gasolines) in
which it was felt that only one side of a controversial issue - the effect of
such products on public health - was being presented by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licensees in the form of advertisements. In the
case of cigarettes, Banzhaff v. FCC 5 3 , the court noted that its ruling for equal
time for countercommercials or presentations promoted the first amendment
policy of fostering the widest possible debate and dissemination of
information on matters of public importance. In the case of commercials for
automobiles and high-octane gasolines, the court noted, "When ...the hazards to health implicit in air pollution are enlarged and aggravated by such
products, then the parallel with cigarette advertising is exact.. .154 and
ignored possible impacts on advertising and licensees as it sent the case back
to the FCC for redetermination.
The idea that broadcast licensees should present balanced information
on advertised but controversial technological processes or products is now a
reality. Once again, the flow of information to the public, as indicated on the
model (Fig. 5), is being enhanced and new corporate attitudes and advertising
practices should follow. (The NEPA, OTA, secrecy, and "Fairness" developments can now be depicted on the model.)
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Fig. 5. Summary of influences and recent developments for decision-making.
How will this enhanced flow of information be used by citizens
responding to the effects of technology? What will be the nature and forms of
the resulting new pressures on decision-makers?
On the model, the broad arrow from citizens to decision-makers
represents now a flow of information, but adversarial processes in courts and
agency proceedings. For decision-makers to learn from an endless series of
adversarial processes is a slow, costly, and painful task that benefits only
lawyers. The task facing the public sector and corporate decision-makers who
are responsible for applications of technology is to transform this relationship
from an adversarial one to one of joint decision-making and negotiation of
differences in good faith among all interested parties - in short, to establish
an ongoing dialogue and joint effort at assessing and planning the uses of
technology. 5 5 This effort will require new institutional management procedures, the development of more sophisticated assessment techniques, the
articulation of assumptions by decision-makers, an opening up of project or
program planning and design stages, and, ultimately, structural and substantive changes in the political system.
Who speaks for the public?" will become a central issue - one that the
federal agencies and the courts are now grappling with in the context of
NEPA. 5 6 Perhaps technology itself may provide some assistance here. Citizen
feedback technology exists, has been used experimentally, and has demonstrated a remarkable potential for both informing citizens and eliciting
opinions and information useful for decision-making. 5 7 The enhanced
process orientation that could result from applications of the recommended
model, improved information flow, and new citizen-feedback techniques
would ensure continuing recognition in decision-making of the pervasive
social impacts of technology.
Can these numerous, fragmented developments in technology and in
our legal and political systems be integrated into a coherent framework for
the social control of technology? It has been noted that (See footnote 58, p.
729):
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"...two major intellectual developments of the 17th
century occurred almost simultaneously in law and science. The
first was the drive for systematic arrangements and presentation
of existing knowledge into scientifically organized categories ... the second ... was the concern with degrees of certainty
or... probability .... By the end of the 17th century... traditional views ... had been upset and new methods of determining
truth and investigating the natural world had replaced those that
had been accepted for centuries ... there was a strong movement
toward arranging both concepts and data into some rational
ordering that could be easily communicated and fitted into the
materials of other fields so that a universal knowledge might
emerge ... traditions of legal history and legal argumentation
that assume the law's autonomous march through history are
seriously in need of correction ......
It is now time to replicate this experience, develop a coherent
framework for the social control of technology, and ensure that
forthcoming processes of technology assessment and utilization will be
systematic and humane.
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